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SOUTH CAROLINA'S UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE - THE DEMISE
OF ITS LONG-ARM PROVISIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although a statute may very well be the "right thing" at
the "right time," its appearing in the "wrong place" may still
make it invalid. Such is developing to be the case with South
Carolina's most recent efforts to "long-arm" in iersonam jurisdiction over nonresident individuals and corporations.
With the enactment of South Carolina's version of the
Uniform Commercial Code in 1966,1 the legislature adopted
one of the most comprehensive "long-arm statutes" yet enacted
by any state. Entitled "Further Remedies,"12 its provisions appear as an eighth part of the sales article-a part not found in
the Uniform Commercial Code's official version. Defining
"person" to include an individual, "whether or not a citizen
or domicilary of this state," and a corporation, "whether or
not organized under the laws of this state, ' 3 this part grants
in personcm jurisdiction to South Carolina's courts under the
following circumstances :4
Personal Jurisdiction Based Upon Conduct
(1) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
person who acts directly or by an agent as to a cause
of action arising from the person's
(a) transacting any business in this state;
(b) contracting to supply services or things in this
state;
(c) commission of a tortious act in whole or in part
in this state;
(d) causing tortious injury or death in this state by
an act or omission outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in
other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state; or
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-101 - 10.10-103 (Supp. 1966).
2. Id. §§ 10.2-801-10.2-809.
3. Id. § 10.2-801.
4. Id. § 10.2-803.
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(e) having an interest in, using, or possessing real
property in this state; or
(f) contracting to insure any person, property or
risk located within this state at the time of contracting; or
(g) entry into a contract to be performed in whole
or in part by either party in this state; or
(h) production, manufacture, or distribution of
goods with the reasonable expectation that those
goods are to be used or consumed in this state
and are so used or consumed.
(2) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon
this section, only a cause of action arising from acts
enumerated in this section may be asserted against
him, and such action, if brought in this state, shall
not be subject to the provisions of Section 10-310 (3),
1962 Code of Laws. 5
Where personal jurisdiction is given, service of process may be
6
made outside of the state.
The scope of these long-arm provisions is easily discernible. Much of the language is almost verbatim that of the Uniform Interstate Procedure Act. 7 By virtue of this act South
Carolina has gone the full distance in granting in personam
jurisdiction over tortfeasors and contracting parties having
an absolute minimal contact with this state. In a time when a
growing number of state legislatures have enacted "long-arm
statutes" in order to broaden the scope of their courts' in
personam jurisdiction over nonresidentsY South Carolina's
statute should rank in the forefront. However, the statute's
validity in part, and arguably in toto, is under constitutional
fire.
Article III, Section 17 of the Constitution of South Carolina specifies that "Every act or resolution having the force
of law shall relate to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." 9 The South Carolina version of the Uniform Commercial Code was enacted under the following title:
5. Which provides: "The court may change the place of trial in the fol
lowing cases: ... (3) When the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change."
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-804 (Supp. 1966).
7. UNIFORM INTERSTATE PRocEDurm Acr § 1.3.
8. Annot. 24 A.L.R.3d 532 (1969); annot. 23 A.L.R.3d 551 (1969).

9. S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 17.
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An Act To Be Known As The Uniform Commercial Code, Relating
to Certain Commercial Transactions In Or Regarding Personal Property And Contracts And Other Documents Concerning Them, Including Sales, Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and Collections, Letters of
Credit, Bulk Transfers, Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading, Other
Documents of Title, Investment Securities, and Secured Transactions, Including Certain Sales of Accounts, Chattel Paper, And Contract Rights, Providing for Public Notice to Third Parties in Certain
Circumstances; Regulating Procedure, Evidence And Damages In
Certain Court Actions Involving Such Transactions, Contracts Or
Documents; To Make Uniform The Law With Respect Thereto; and
Repealing Inconsistent Legislation.10

Successful arguments have been made to the effect that the
above title did not sufficiently reflect all the long-arm provisions of South Carolina's Uniform Commercial Code so as to
meet the requirements of Article III, Section 17. Noticeably
in such arguments, no contention is made that a "long-arm
statute" of this kind is unwise or unnecessary, or beyond the
authority of the legislature. The deciding factor has been the
place in the South Carolina Code at which it is located-a factor quite apart from the merits of such a statute and more
reflective of the courts' attitude toward the manner in which
it was enacted. The two most recent cases to hold certain provisions of South Carolina's "long-arm statute" inconsistent
with Article III, Section 17, were decided in the Federal District Court of South Carolina, where those sections conferring
jurisdiction upon the South Carolina courts based on tortious
act or injury within the state were held unconstitutional."II.

DUE PRoCEsS VIOLATED

In McGee v. Holan Division of Ohio Brass C0.12 the court
was faced with the question of whether a party plaintiff had
acquired in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate
defendant. It has been said: "There is nothing to compel a
state to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation unless
it chooses to do so, and to the extent to which it so chooses is a
matter for the law of the state as made by its legislature."', 3
10.
11.
1972);
12.
13.
1948).

Act 1065, 54 Stat. 4027 (1966).
McGee v. Holan Div. of Ohio Brass Co., 337 F. Supp. 72 (D.S.C.
Tention v. Southern Pac. R.R., 336 F. Supp. 25 (D.S.C. 1972).
337 F. Supp. 72 (D.S.C. 1972).
Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193, 194 (1st Cir.
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Only when a state elects to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation can there be a question of whether the election
violated the Due Process clause. 14 In order to resolve the question, courts must carefully examine the facts of the particular
case before them.
McGee was an action for personal injuries sustained by
the plaintiff when the aerial hydraulic bucket in which he was
working as an electrical lineman for Sumter Builders, Inc. fell
to the ground. The bucket and other equipment was purchased
by Sumter Builders from defendant's plant in Georgia. The
defendant was a corporation chartered and existing under the
laws of New Jersey, with its principal place of business located
in Ohio. Defendant's only "contact" with South Carolina was
through a sales representative, living in North Carolina, who
made approximately two trips per year to Sumter Builders'
place of business in South Carolina. The equipment in question was not purchased directly from defendant, but rather
through Graybar Electric Co., a wholly separate and distinct
corporation. Deliveries of defendant's equipment to South
Carolina were not made by the defendant's trucks or vehicles.
South Carolina's service of process statutes applicable to
foreign corporations not authorized to do business in the state
are predicated upon finding the corporation to be "transacting"' 5 or "doing"'1 business in fact. When the facts so indicate, service of process can be made through the Secretary of
State. Foreign corporations authorized to do business in the
state must appoint an agent for service of process. Alternative service through the Secretary of State is provided in certain instances.' 7
In viewing South Carolina's service of process statutes
as applied to foreign corporations, federal courts have said
they "approach, if they do not reach, ultimate constitutional
bounds ;"18 and, most recently, they extend "to the outer limits
allowed by InternationalShoe."' 9 The South Carolina Supreme
Court has stated the jurisdictional test to be that the foreign
14. Id.

15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-424 (Supp. 1971).
16. Id. § 12-23.14.
17. Id. § 12-23.13.
18. Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 102, 107 (4th. Cir. 1962).
19. Ratliff v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 747 (4th Cir. 1971).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol24/iss3/10

4

Folks: South Carolina's Uniform Commercial Code--The Demise of Its LongSOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 24

corporation have such contact with South Carolina, that maintenance here of an action against it in personam does not "of20
fend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Recognizing such a principle to be "nebulous" and one to be
resolved upon the facts of the particular case, suggested factors for consideration should be:
[T]he duration and nature of the corporate activity within the state, the

character of the acts giving rise to the litigation, the circumstances of
their commission, and the relative inconvenience to the respective parties of a trial in the state of the forum on the one hand and in the state
21
of the corporate domicile on the other.

With little elaboration, Judge Chapman in McGee found
the contacts of the defendant to be "so minimal that to require
it to stand and defend this case in this district would be offensive to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 22 Citing Shealy v. Challenger Manufacturing Co. 2 3 on
which the plaintiff principally relied, Judge Chapman concluded that there the court's finding the defendant manufacturer to be "doing business" in South Carolina was primarily
based on the frequent deliveries of defendant's products to
South Carolina in his trucks.2 4 Although the facts in McGee
and Shealy are fairly analagous, the defendant's products in
McGee were not delivered to South Carolina in defendant's
trucks. On this basis Judge Chapman distinguished the two
sets of jurisdictional facts. Another distinguishing feature in
the facts of the two cases not mentioned in McGee is that in
20. Boney v. Trans-State Dredging Co., 237 S.C. 54, 61, 115 S.E.2d 508,
512 (1960) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ;
accord, Carolina Boat & Plastics Co. v. Glascoat Distribs., 249 S.C. 49, 53, 152
S.E.2d 352, 353 (1967).
21. Carolina Boat & Plastics Co. v. Glascoat Distribs., 249 S.C. 49, 53,
152 S.E.2d 352, 353-354 (1967) ; Boney v. Trans-State Dredging Co., 237 S.C.
54, 62, 115 S.E.2d 508, 512 (1960) ; see Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d
102 (4th. Cir. 1962) for a good survey of the interpretation and application of
South Carolina's service of process statutes.
22. 337 F. Supp. 72, 74 (D.S.C. 1972).
23. 304 F.2d 102 (4th. Cir. 1962). This is a case involving a Tennessee
manufacturer of disappearing or folding stairways, which maintained no
place of business in South Carolina, but which did sell and deliver its products
to a wholesaler or dealer whose principal office was in South Carolina with
designated branches throughout the state. The manufacturer was held amenable
to suit in South Carolina in an action for personal injuries caused by a defective stairway purchased from one of these designated branches.
24. 337 F. Supp. 72, 74 (D.S.C. 1972).
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Shealy the defective product was purchased in South Carolina,
whereas in McGee, the product ultimately causing plaintiff's
personal injury was purchased in Georgia.
III.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF McGEE

Although South Carolina's service of process statutes by
which the state courts may acquire in personmm jurisdiction
over foreign corporations are construed liberally through application of International Shoe's "minimum contact" test, the
traditional statutory possibilities for service of process on nonresident individuals is much more restrictive. Service in these
cases depends on the defendant's presence within the state.25
However, the confines of the applicable statute are broadened
somewhat in that "presence" does not necessarily mean physical presence. "Under the statute, a defendant is present within
the state when he is (1) physically present, so that personal
service can be effected; or (2) has a place of residence or business within the state, in which event substituted service may
be had on a person of discretion residing at the residence or
'26
an employee at the place of business.
Thus, the impact of such a comprehensive "long-arm
statute" as enacted in South Carolina's version of the Uniform
Commercial Code-one which applies equally to both nonresident individuals and foreign corporations-becomes clear.
Until its passage, a court's acquiring in personam jurisdiction
over a nonresident individual depended on that individual's
"presence" within the state. Even the broad construction of
"presence" by the cases does not put that standard for service
of process on nonresident individuals on comparable footing
with the minimum contacts test as interpreted regarding service on foreign corporations. South Carolina's Uniform Commercial Code's long-arm provisions have the effect of leveling
the standards between nonresident individuals and corporations, though the approach is different: in the case of the
foreign corporation, a rather broad standard (minimum contacts) under which to work applies from the state; in the case
of the nonresident individual, more specifically drawn bases
for finding in personm jurisdiction exist (10.2-803 (1) (a) (h)), with, however, possibilities for broad application.
25. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10-438 (Supp. 1971).

26. Ballew v. Ballew, 251 S.C. 496, 499, 163 S.E.2d 622, 623-624 (1968).
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Consequently, the significance of McGee lies more in its
holding unconstitutional those provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code's "long-arm statute" relative to the commission
of tortious acts or injuries within the state as a basis for in
personam jurisdiction, than in finding insufficient contacts in
the state to warrant service of process under South Carolina's
"unauthorized foreign corporation doing business in the state"
statute. 27 In so invalidating these long-arm provisions of the
statute under an argument which casts doubt on the validity
of the other long-arm provisions, the court has struck down
the leveling effect such a statute would have served on service
of process standards for nonresident individuals and corporations.
IV. ARTICLE III, SECTION 17 VIOLATED
The constitutional specification that "[e] very act or resolution having the force of law shall relate to but one subject,
and that shall be expressed in the title"28 has received so many
and varied interpretations by the courts and law-writers, that
an attempt to lay down a fixed rule by which all could be reconciled would be futile.2 9 Yet the cases generally agree that its
purpose is to prevent surprise or deception of the people at the
hands of the legislature and, likewise, to prevent surprise or
deception of the legislature at the hands of itself. 30 As expressed in one fairly recent case: "Its purpose is to prevent the
General Assembly from being misled into the passage of bills
containing provisions not indicated in their titles, and to apprise the people of the subject of proposed legislation and thus
to give them opportunity to be heard if they so desire." 31 In
deciding whether a particular statute is inconsistent with the
language and purpose of Article III, Section 17, a court must
weigh the abuses against which it is directed against the
32
possibility of embarrassing or obstructing needed legislation.
In so doing, the constitutional provision is to be construed
27. S.C. CODE ANN. §12-23.14 (Supp. 1971).
28. S.C. CoNsT. art. 3, § 17.
29. Douglass v. Watson, 186 S.C. 34, 42, 195 S.E. 116, 119 (1937).
30. Dantzler v. Callison, 230 S.C. 75, 94 S.E.2d 177 (1956).
31. Colonial Life & Accid. Ins. Co. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 233 S.C. 129, 144,
103 S.E.2d 908, 915-916 (1958).
32. Dantzler v. Callison, 230 S.C. 75, 89-90, 94 S.E.2d 177, 185 (1956);
Alley v. Daniel, 153 S.C. 217, 220, 150 S.E. 691, 692 (1929).
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"with great liberality" 33 and is not to be enforced in any "nar34
row or technical spirit."
Construing Article III, Section 17, Judge Chapman in
McGee concluded that under the title to South Carolina's version of the Uniform Commercial Code, to enact sections granting South Carolina courts in personam jurisdiction of nonresident defendants in connection with certain tort claims was to
commit "the very evil that the framers of the South Carolina
Constitution were attempting to avoid." 35 He was of the
opinion that everything in the Act's title related to commercial
transactions, thus no warning was provided the people of
South Carolina that they were getting anything other than the
national recognized Uniform Commercial Code, much less anything so "uncommercial" as provisions for jurisdiction and
service in personal injury tort claims.3 6 In so far as the legislature itself was concerned, Judge Chapman stated: "With
such a voluminous act it is doubtful if all the members of the
General Assembly realized that it contained provisions unrelated to commercial transactions.13 7 Sections 10.2-803(1)(c)
& (d) of South Carolina's Uniform Commercial Code, in his
judgment, must be held unconstitutional.

V.
A.

PREVIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF 10.2-803

In Federal Court

Judge Russell, formerly of the Federal District Court for
the District of South Carolina, twice considered the applicability of certain sections of 10.2-803 and on both occasions
sustained them. In Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Tex38
tured Fibres,
10.2-803 (1) (g) (conferring jurisdiction over
persons who enter into a contract to be performed in whole or
in part by either party in South Carolina) was held constitutional despite argument that it violated Article III, Section 17.
39
And in Jenrette v. Seaboa'rd Coast Line Railroad,
Judge
33. Dantzler v. Callison, 230 S.C. 75, 94 S.E.2d 177 (1956); Gasque v.
Nates, 191 S.C. 271, 2 S.E.2d 36 (1939).
34. Dantzler v. Callison, 230 S.C. 75, 94 S.E.2d 177 (1956); Alley v.
Daniel, 153 S.C. 217, 150 S.E. 691 (1929).

35. 337 F. Supp. 72, 75 (D.S.C. 1972).
36. Id.

37. Id. at 76.
38. 310 F. Supp. 491 (D.S.C. 1970).

39. 308 F. Supp. 642 (D.S.C. 1969).
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Russell discussed 10.2-803(1) (d) (in certain instances conferring jurisdiction over persons who cause tortious injury or
death in South Carolina by an act or omission outside the
state) without constitutional consideration, although he found
it not to apply to the facts of that particular case. It is noteworthy, however, that after the final order in each case, Judge
Russell acknowledged that the reasoning in his opinion raised
questions of law on which there could be "substantial ground
for difference of opinion"; he, therefore, recommended "an
immediate appeal" to "materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation," as well as any litigation which may
follow. 40
Since 10.2-803(1) (g) was held constitutional in Deering
despite specific argument that it violated Article III, Section
17, Judge Chapman's finding in McGee that 10.2-803 (1) (c)
& (d) were unconstitutional on the same argument could not
have been sustained without finding some basis for distinction.
Judge Chapman found basis for distinction in that in Deering,
the court was dealing with a service of process statute based
on contract, so the constitutional test of Article III, Section
17 was met by use of the word -'procedure" in the Act's title;
whereas in McGee, the court was dealing with a service of
process statute based on tort, of which no notice was conferred
through the word "procedure" or any other language in the
41
title to the Act.
Gardnerv. Q. H. S., Inc. 4 2 is another federal case in which
South Carolina's long-arm provisions within the Uniform Commercial Code were mentioned. This was an action brought by
apartment owners, North Carolina residents doing business as
a partnership in South Carolina, against a New York manufacturer of hair curlers for property damage to the apartment
complex sustained when the hair curlers allegedly caught fire.
Since jurisdiction was found over the nonresident corporate
defendant on the basis of its "doing business" in fact, if not
authorized to do so,43 the court did not get to consideration of
plaintiff's argument for jurisdiction under the Uniform Com40. Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Textured Fibres, Inc., 310 F. Supp.
491, 503 (D.S.C. 1970); Jenrette v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 308 F. Supii
642, 645 (D.S.C. 1969).
41. 337 F. Supp. 72, 76 (D.S.C. 1972).
42. 304 F. Supp. 1247 (D.S.C. 1969).
43. S.C. CODE AxN. § 12-23.14 (Supp. 1971).
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mercial Code. 44 In so deciding the case, the court exhibited its
preference for finding jurisdiction under a statute which was
"well developed" and its reluctance to base a finding for or
against jurisdiction under a statute which the South Carolina
45
Supreme Court has yet to interpret.
B.

In State Court
Although the highest court in South Carolina has not to
date considered the constitutionality of the state's Uniform
Commercial Code long-arm provisions, the question has been
decided at the lower level on at least two occasions: deLoack
v. Nask,46 in which the commission of tortious act in whole or
in part in South Carolina as a basis for exercising in personm
jurisdiction was held to be in violation of Article III, Section
17; and, Byrd v. Melton,4? in which the provision conferring
in permonam jurisdiction over persons having interest in, using, or possessing real property in South Carolina, as well as
the basis for jurisdiction stemming from the commission of a
tort within the state, 48 were declared by the court to be unconstitutional. Both cases were cited by Judge Chapman in McGee,
pointing out that
"two distinguished state trial judges, Honorable William L. Rhodes,
Jr. (deLoach) and Honorable Francis B. Nicholson (Byrd), in separate orders, have held that even the most liberal construction would not
include these sections under the existing title and have held that Section 10.2-803(1) (c) violates -the requirements of Article III, Section
17 of the Constitution of this state." 4 9

deLoach v. NaskL
This was an action for personal injuries sustained by the
plaintiff while shopping in a-large discount store in Columbia,
South Carolina. Plaintiff's cause of action was based on defendant's alleged negligent act of colliding with the plaintiff
while she was a customer in the store. The defendant,a resident of Ohio, was the sole party against whom plaintiff proceeded.
Service of process was procured under the long-arm provisions of South Carolina's Uniform Commercial Code; the basis
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. § 10.2-806.
304 F. Supp. 1247, 1248 n.3 (D.S.C. 1969).
No. 4418 (Richland County Ct. of Com. Pleas, filed Mar. 29, 1971).
No. 5133 (Richland County Ct. of Com. Pleas, filed July 15, 1971).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 102-803 (1) (c) & (e) (Supp. 1966).
337 F. Supp. 72, 75 (D.S.C. 1972).
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for jurisdiction rested in defendant's alleged commission of a
tort within the state.5 0 Defendant specially appeared to move
that the attempted service of the summons and complaint upon
him be set aside. In argument on the motion before Judge
Rhodes, defendant contended that 10.2-803 (1) (c) was unconstitutional under Article III, Section 17.
After reviewing the title under which the relevant longarm provision was enacted and generally stating the law with
respect to Article III, Section 17, Judge Rhodes in his order
cited two cases in which provisions, not sufficiently reflected
in the title to the act under which they were enacted, were
found to be unconstitutional. 51 Similarly in this case, Judge
Rhodes found that there was "not the slightest inference" that
the procedural provisions of the title to South Carolina's Uniform Commercial Code embraced service outside the state in a
tort action when the tort sued upon is completely divorced
from a commercial transaction, contract, or document.5 2 He
stated further:
"The title . . . expressly limits the procedure contemplated to 'court
actions involving such transactions, contracts or documents.' That the
term 'such transactions' refers to commercial transactions is obvious
since commercial transactions are the only transactions mentioned in
the title."5 3

Judge Rhodes pointed out that the stated purposes of the act
spoke only of commercial transactions.5 4
Careful to specify that he was holding 10.2-803 (1) (c)
only to be in violation with Article III, Section 17, Judge
Rhodes found Deering not applicable since Judge Russell there
considered the constitutionality of 10.2-803 (1) (g), a provision
relative to a contract to be performed in whole or in part by
50. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10.2-803(1) (c) (Supp. 1966).
51. Colonial Life & Accid. Ins. Co. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 233 S.C. 129, 103
S.E.2d 908 (1958) ; Douglass v. Watson, 186 S.C. 34, 195 S.E. 116 (1937).
52. No. 4418 at 7 (Richland County Ct. of Com. Pleas, filed Mar. 29,
1971).
53. Id.
54. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10.1-102(2) (Supp. 1966) provides:
"Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are (a) to simplify,
clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial
practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."
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either party in South Carolina, one which Judge Rhodes would
agree was sufficiently reflected in the Act's title under "procedure" so as to meet the constitutional test. 55
In response to plaintiff's argument that 10.2-715 (2) (b) 50
was sufficient authorization for the legislature to adopt 10.2803(1) (c), under which service was made, Judge Rhodes
pointed out that plaintiff's cause of action was not based an
breach of warranty or any other commercial transaction, but
rather one founded on negligence. "The controlling factor as
the court sees it is that the defendant's negligence did not arise
from any commercial transaction nor did it in any way involve
the transactions, contracts, or documents referred to in the
title of the Act."5 7
Byrd v. Melton
Byrd was an action brought for the alleged wrongful
death of a minor child who apparently drowned upon falling
into a ditch in Columbia, South Carolina. Four individuals
were joined as defendants based upon some interest or degree
of management in the property where the child's accidental
death occurred. The complaint alleged that the defendants
were negligent and reckless in failing to rectify a dangerous
situation when they knew or should have known that children
were playing in the area, were attracted thereto, etc.
Two of the four defendants were nonresidents of South
Carolina, but were served personally at their residences in
their home states pursuant to the "long-arm statute" enacted
as a part of South Carolina's Uniform Commercial Code: specifically under 10.2-803(1) (c) which allows the courts of
South Carolina to exercise personal jurisdiction over a person
as to a cause of action arising from that person's commission
of a tortious act within the state, and 10.2-803 (1) (e) which
similarly confers such jurisdiction on persons having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in South Carolina.
These two defendants appeared specially for the sole purpose
55. No. 4418 at 8 (Richland County Ct. of Com. Pleas, filed Mar. 29,

1971).
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-715(2)(b) (Supp. 1966) provides: "(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include ... (b)injury to
person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty."
57. No. 4418 at 9 (Richland County Ct. of Com. Pleas, filed Mar. 29,

1971).
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of moving to set aside such attempted service of process. They
argued before Judge Nicholson that the long-arm provisions
according to which they were served were in violation of Article III, Section 17. Judge Nicholson agreed, holding 10.2803(1) (c) & (e) to be unconstitutional.
Patterning his order much after that in deLoch, Judge
Nicholson asserted that the word "procedure" and the term
"such transactions" in the Act's title were only in reference to
commercial transactions and clearly not indicative of procedural provisions embracing service outside the state based
on the commission of a tort or the owning of real property in
South Carolina.A8 The title of the Act specifically states that
the Act relates to "certain commercial transactions in or regarding personal property and contracts and other documents
concerning them." 0 In addition to pointing out that the Act's
stated purposes spoke of only commercial transactions, 0
Judge Nicholson found nothing in the Act's title dealing with
real property and quoted from Section 10.2-102: "Unless the
context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions
in goods;... ."61 Since Deering "clearly involved a commercial
transaction," and Jenrette "held that the aforementioned Statutes (10.2-801 et seq.) did not factually apply," both cases
02
were distinguished.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Until a decision by the South Carolina Supreme Court on
the question of the constitutionality of the state's long-arm
provisions enacted in its version of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the "sides" as taken in the lower state courts and in the
different divisions of the federal district court in South Carolina are likely to remain with two lower state court judges and
one federal district court judge holding that those long-arm
provisions wholly unrelated to commercial transactions (10.2803(1) (c), (d) & (e)) are unconstitutional and one former
federal district court judge who held that the long-arm pro58.
1971).
59.
60.
61.

No. 5133 at 6-7 (Richland County Ct. of Com. Pleas, filed July 15,
Act 1065, 54 Stat. 4027 (1966).
See note 57, supra.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-102 (Supp. 1966).

62. No. 5133 at 7-8 (Richland County Ct. of Com. Pleas, filed July 15,

1971).
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vision relative to entry or performance of a contract in South
Carolina as a basis for jurisdiction (10.2-803 (1) (g)) is constitutional, and assuming that one of the two long-arm provisions dealing with tort (10.2-803 (1) (d)) would be constitutional if applicable to the facts of a particular case.
Such diversity of opinion certainly lessens the impact of
the comprehensive long-arm provisions as prescribed in the
statute. To date, only one provision, that granting jurisdiction in personcm over persons who enter into a contract to be
performed in whole or in part by either party in South Carolina (10.2-803(1) (g)), would presumably be sustained over
constitutional objection based on Article III, Section 17. It is
not inconceivable, however, that certain other provisions of
the long-arm statute, akin to commercial transactions, might
withstand this constitutional challenge, but the arguments for
unconstitutionality have been so basic that if these provisions
are to be sustained, it is not likely to be without litigation.
So long as the question of this statute's constitutionality
in unanswered by South Carolina's highest court, equalization
of the standards for service of process on nonresident individuals and foreign corporations, whether desired as a matter of
policy or logic, will not materialize. Significantly, the current
constitutional objection to all aspects of the "long-arm statute"
lies outside the realm of policy or logic. The objection, as reflected in its constitutional basis, is directed at the place in
South Carolina's statutory law in which the statute is foundan objection that has more to do with form than substance.
Notwithstanding this observation, the constitutional objection
is very real when the constitution is given a literal or strict
construction. Its cure however need not necessarily lie in the
courts. Its cure would seemingly, more appropriately be found
in the hands of the legislature which has the authority to reenact the statute's provisions as a separate piece of legislation
under a title which leaves no room for constitutional question
under Article III, Section 17.
ROBERT
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